Chamber and committees

I want to follow up on the point that Ruth Boyle just made—this is probably another question for Philip Whyte, and is on a point of clarification. I am broadly sympathetic to the tax proposals that you have laid out. However, on the question of local inheritance tax, my understanding of the current settlement is that we are allowed to create new local taxes but not if they replicate an existing national tax. Something like local inheritance tax or local capital gains tax would be outwith the current devolution settlement—the UK Government would not allow that because it replicates something that already operates UK wide. Obviously, that is in your proposals. Do you have a different understanding of what is currently within scope?

Does anybody else want to come in on that?

Professor Bell, do you have any thoughts on that? If I remember correctly, the citizens assembly that you mentioned came up with a pretty long list of potential new tax and revenue-raising powers. In that assembly, which was supposed to be broadly representative, there was a pretty broad consensus on the need not just to raise additional revenue but to broaden the sources of it. I am interested in your thoughts on where public opinion sits on these questions.

Thank you.

Can I jump in? Would the aligned and progressive tax model that you talk about be possible purely with currently devolved levers if the UK Government were not to work in lockstep, for example, on the child benefit policy that you identified? Is it possible for us to do that just with what is currently available under the devolution settlement?

I want to pick up on what Mr Sousa said about public opinion and challenge the idea that there is wide public opposition to increasing tax. I am looking at two polls from roughly this time last year. The Scottish poll is from last December, and it showed that a majority of people—by a margin of more than two to one—are supportive of rather than opposed to the Scottish Government’s increase in the higher rate of income tax. There was a UK-wide poll just before the Liz Truss mini-budget that showed that a majority of people are in favour of increasing taxes to increase spending on, among other things, social security, which is interesting, given the attempts to demonise that. The most recent British election study shows that the vast majority of the UK electorate have left-of-centre economic values, even if they would not use a label like that, including a majority of Conservative voters.

I recognise that there is a difference between public opinion and the actual effect of public policy changes. If every general practitioner in the country was in the minority of people opposed to tax rises and half of them moved to Australia as a result of tax rises, that would clearly have an impact. Is there an issue that, when we are talking about the public discussion of taxation, as John Mason touched on, the public discourse as defined by politicians and experts is quite far removed from the majority of public opinion on core economic values?

Thank you.

How do those numbers—the three and seven out of 10—compare with what would usually be the case with a script remarking service?

Presumably, you get far fewer appeals with script remarking than you did last year with a different system.

Sorry to cut in—I am conscious of time. That is the core issue, because it comes back to the debate that we have had over the past couple of years and discussions that I have had with you on those exceptional circumstances: the young people who had a family bereavement immediately before their exam or a panic attack during their exam or whatever. I have brought some of those cases to you as casework, and we have had wider policy discussions about them. How do we make sure that the young people in those exceptional circumstances, of which there are a wide variety, get a fair opportunity?