Chamber and committees

When these discussions started a couple of years ago, the corporate body did discuss how best to start such conversations. Would it be through mechanisms such as you outline, Mr Marra—letters to party leaders, for example? Would it be through direct approaches to committees or to members who are proposing commissioners or backing proposals for commissioners? Given the way in which our responsibilities are currently outlined, they are post-event. That is the politics of it. I think that we at the corporate body do a pretty good job of not engaging in those kinds of discussions.

I would make two points on that. First, at the corporate body, we have had conversations with the Scottish Human Rights Commission about the level of resourcing and the expected additional resources that the commission considers might be necessary should proposed legislation go through the Parliament.

As for what that would mean, we have received requests for additional resources, we have knocked some of them back and we have granted some of them—or granted them in part—depending on what has been going on. If there were a change in the structure and responsibilities of the Scottish Human Rights Commission, with a rapporteur or similar model, there would be a fairer expectation of redesigning how the commission’s resources are allocated. If some of those additional people—the rapporteurs—came with powers and additional functions, it would be safe to assume—

The corporate body recognises that there are different models. You mentioned the police and the prisons inspectorates, which might fulfil part of the role that some of the commissioners fulfil.

You asked about the difference that it would make to us. We do not have any role or responsibility in relation to the inspectorates that you have mentioned or bodies such as the Scottish National Investment Bank. Our role kicks in once an office-holder is identified and created. There are clearly other models where the Government has responsibility for the establishment of the body and retains that responsibility, and committees engage and scrutinise as they see fit.

The corporate body has responsibilities for funding and governance, and it would be easier to deal with one contact than with several. That is a pretty clear line.

We have an interest in, if not a responsibility for, scrutinising the commissioners’ functions. Alongside any changes that the corporate body might have to make, there would be consequential changes to how committees function and how they deal with their scrutiny role. As Jackson Carlaw said, we are not convinced that that happens as robustly as it ought to now, so how would that change, what would be put at risk and what might be improved if there were a different model?

A reduction in the number of commissioners would make it easier to deal with funding lines and budget requests. We might ask slightly different questions to help us understand how the different rapporteurs would fit together within that structure, but any questions about commissioners’ functions would probably sit better with committees.

One challenge that we have had in looking at that bit of our overall budget is that about 80 per cent of the budget is staffing costs. As staff costs increase, there is very little wriggle room, because of the substantial proportion that staffing costs make up.

If we were to fix that, that would, over time, be expected to result in a reduction in the number of staff carrying out the same number of duties. Unless there is a consequential change in the duties that office-holders are required to perform—some of which are in legislation—there would be significant challenges in that regard.

I am not sure that there is a shared corporate body view on that. It depends on how quickly we want to get to the point of looking at the architecture and structure within which the functions sit, as Jackson Carlaw has highlighted.

It is perhaps more difficult to deal with the commissioners that already exist; indeed, the 2009 review of SPCB-supported bodies found exactly that. Lots of work went into that, and it made very clear recommendations with well-justified rationales, but the Parliament decided not to go ahead with them. It would be strange if there were not the same resistance now.

As for new and proposed commissioners, there is an opportunity for us to have conversations with the individuals who might be proposing them, with members, with campaign groups and with the committees that would be responsible for the functional scrutiny of those roles. The questions that we need to ask are: are they the best option, and what is the problem that you are trying to fix?

I think that that would be helpful. It is also clear—indeed, you have referred to it—that the proposals that are coming forward in the rights and advocacy spaces might be closely linked.

Last year, the Scottish Human Rights Commission itself produced a report on the potential expansion of the commissioner landscape into rights spaces. I think that none of us would wish our national human rights institution to be hollowed out by siphoning off its roles and responsibilities, and powers, to other parts that do not sit within it.

One of the challenges relates to some of the proposals that we see in the advocacy and rights spaces. Some would give the commissioners more rights, and more powers, than the national human rights institute currently has. We should probably all be thinking about that: why does our national human rights body not have greater powers and authority to act in comparison with other bodies, whether they be commissioners, non-departmental public bodies or whatever?

There is also a question around independence. In addition to the systemic failures that we have addressed, one of the reasons for people considering that an advocacy and rights-based role is required is that it would be independent from Government and from the control of, and framework setting for, public services. There is a tension in that respect that perhaps comes from not only the failure to get the service, but a lack of trust that those services can deliver what is needed.

We have already discussed the range of commissioners’ roles. The regulatory commissioners have very particular roles, as do the complaints-handling commissioners. Many of us might have questions, such as whether we are getting value for money out of the Electoral Commission, for example, but the answers to those questions are not necessarily ours to give. The corporate body is tasked with ensuring that there is compliance around governance, employment, accountable officers and those kinds of things, and that we understand what the commissioners are trying to achieve and, therefore, what resources they require in order to do that. Without simply giving them what they want without question, we are trying, as best we can, to give them the resources to carry out those roles.

The question about outcomes and operational functionality would be a question for the scrutiny committees. Do they think that the office-holders and commissioners are delivering what they were intended to deliver? The corporate body and the committees have a clear joint responsibility to answer that question.

When it comes to the commissioners whom we currently support and the proposals that come forward—those that have been enacted and those that are in the pipeline—campaign groups, individuals and organisations seek to establish commissioners for a variety of reasons. Some of those elements stem from systemic failure and from a recognition that maybe people’s rights are not being realised or respected or that there are fundamental issues with how people are being treated, particularly in the justice and health sectors. We have already referenced the patient safety commissioner for Scotland; we are also aware of a victims and witnesses commissioner for Scotland, which is in a bill that is going through the Parliament.

Such systemic failures are for the Parliament and the Scottish Government to address. Often, people think that a commissioner can provide an independent and separate view as an advocate, a champion and a mechanism to remedy some of those systemic failures.

I do not know whether Jackson Carlaw or David McGill wants to comment further.

Yes—we probably share that view across the corporate body with regard to mergers or amalgamation. There was a clear suggestion in that respect in 2009.