Citizen Participation and Public Petitions Committee [Draft]

Meeting date: Wednesday, May 29, 2024

Official Report 769KB pdf

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A9 Dualling Project

That brings us directly to item 2, which is an evidence session as part of our inquiry into the A9 dualling project. This morning’s evidence session follows on from the committee’s previous evidence session, when we heard from former First Minister Alex Salmond.

We are joined again by Edward Mountain MSP in his capacity as a reporter on the inquiry from the Net Zero, Energy and Transport Committee. I also see that the petitioner, Laura Hansler, is in the gallery. She has been a faithful attendee of the committee when we have been taking evidence on the petition and considering the issues that it raises.

Those who have been following our inquiry will know that our primary objective is to ensure that the A9 project is now on track and will be delivered. That is what the petitioner is keen to see.

The petition also calls for a national memorial to all those whose lives have been lost on the A9 over the years. At the very end of our previous evidence session, we asked Mr Salmond for his views on that, and we will perhaps come on to it with this morning’s witness later.

I am absolutely delighted that we have with us Nicola Sturgeon MSP, the former First Minister. We will move straight to questions.

We have had a lot of evidence from technical people, from different trades, people affected by issues with the route and ministers. You contributed evidence, along with others. Alex Neil suggested that we should go looking for various bits of paperwork—I did not realise that that paperwork would be a foot thick when we got it. We have been through it all.

I do not want to pre-empt the committee, but I do not think that, at this stage, colleagues think there is any smoking gun in relation to the non-completion of the road. However, it seems that, at some point, something happened—I do not know whether we will ever be entirely clear what it was—that led to a dilution of the focus and the drive to take forward the project.

When we heard evidence from Mr Salmond, he said—perhaps not unexpectedly—that all was hale and hearty when he left office. The Scottish National Party’s manifesto commitment underpinned the priority of the project, perhaps over other national infrastructure projects that might have been regarded as equally viable. A lot of the work during Mr Salmond’s time involved preparatory investigation of what would be required, but there was no suggestion—in the public mind or in the mind of the Parliament—that the road would not be delivered on budget and on time in the years immediately after that.

I am interested in your perspective on what happened. I realise that, as Cabinet Secretary for Infrastructure, Capital Investment and Cities, and subsequently as First Minister, you had different views on what was going on, but we know that the road did not get built, so something did not happen. The committee is interested in trying to understand what happened so that we can see whether there are lessons to be learned.

I will do my best to respond to that question and, in the course of today’s session, to answer questions as fully as I can.

My starting point is to agree with your starting point: I do not think there is any smoking gun or anything deeply sinister for the committee to uncover. Clearly this is from my perspective, but I do not agree that there was a diminution of focus and drive behind the A9 project. During my time as First Minister, the two sections of dualling that have now been completed were completed, and there was, and there continues to be, an incredible amount of work to progress things.

In preparing for this session, I have had the opportunity to go back and read all the relevant paperwork—I thought that I had left behind reading Government papers when I stood down from Government. When the 2025 target was set back in 2011, we were absolutely committed to it, in good faith. The question in my mind now—this will undoubtedly also be a question in the committee’s mind—is whether there was sufficient rigour and openness about just how challenging a target it was. When I look at it now, it is clear that, for the target to have been met, we would have to have had a fair wind on every aspect of the project that we were embarking on. Of course, we did not have a fair wind on every aspect of it. I have no doubt that we will come on to some of the issues, but, for example, the 2014 change of classification of the non-profit distributing model, austerity, Brexit and the pandemic all had an impact.

We encountered a situation of great complexity. We talk about the A9 being a single project, but it is actually 11 major projects in one. A lot of effort went into some of the preparatory stages. One example is public consultation. I do not want to sound as though I am underplaying the challenges, but I think that one of the achievements is that, unlike the situation with the Aberdeen bypass, we have not ended up getting caught up in endless legal processes through challenges and public inquiries.

That is my observation. With any such project that has not been delivered in the timescale that was initially set, it would be appropriate to look back, at an appropriate time—this committee’s deliberations will be part of that process—to see whether there were stages or points at which things could have gone quicker than they did. However, I think that we have progressed the A9 with drive and determination; it is simply that we have encountered significant challenges along the way. Although some of those challenges were foreseeable in a project of such a scale, many of the others that were encountered were not foreseeable at the time that the 2025 target was set.

You challenged the suggestion that there was any diminution in focus. I made that suggestion only because, when we read the papers and saw the timeline, it seemed that, all the way through until about 2018, everyone was still adhering to an expectation that the road would be delivered as initially forecast. There was no change in the public perception after that date, but, from reading the paperwork, a sense creeps in that there was a feeling that other funding models might need to be explored—a feeling of, “How might we go about that?” It is not clear from the paperwork whether it was ministers who were driving a review or whether a review was being suggested to them.

Keith Brown, who was pretty experienced and had a track record in relation to the delivery of national infrastructure projects, left the responsibility at that point and was succeeded, I think, by Michael Matheson. From reading the paperwork, we feel slightly confused about what happened at that point. We cannot point to anything in particular, but it looks as though something happened at that point that is not in the public domain, the discussion around which led to a delay.

Having very recently reread all of that paperwork, I think that that is a fair point to draw out, but I do not necessarily agree that underneath that was a sign of something going wrong. I think that that is a reflection of what was under consideration at that point.

I think this point has been made to the committee, but it is worth repeating. Under the Scottish public finance manual, in projects of this nature, consideration of private finance options is required. Therefore, such consideration was necessary. In 2014, the NPD model became unavailable to us, in effect, because of its reclassification as public rather than private finance. That was followed by a period of consideration of a different potential private finance route, should the Government have decided to take such a route. There was no obvious alternative for a period. It has taken until very recently to settle on the mutual investment model that the current cabinet secretary has announced and spoken about. Therefore, I think that that simply reflects the very technical nature of the work that was being undertaken in the period from 2018 onwards.

Having reread that paperwork, there is another observation that I would make. Again, it is not a conclusion but a question that I think it is perfectly reasonable for the committee to at least ask. At that point—from 2018 and certainly for the couple of years after that—should we have been a bit more open about the work that was going on? The search for a viable private finance model was under way, but we had not abandoned the prospect of a design and build, capital-funded option as well. That was the option that was still theoretically possible—I use that phrase deliberately—in a 2025 timescale; the private one would not have been. We were still grappling with many of those issues at that point, in good faith, and the work was being done internally. The question—which I think is a reasonable one—is, should some of that have been aired a bit more publicly?

Let me explore that, and then I will move on to colleagues. In your written submission, you drew a distinction between the period when you had a direct responsibility for infrastructure and your wider responsibilities as First Minister, when you had more of an overview of those matters. I am interested in understanding the extent to which you, as First Minister—not now, from reading the papers, but at the time—understood that this was percolating into something that might involve a delay, and whether any discussion took place about the need for perhaps more public candour about what the impact would be.

I do not recall our having a discussion at the time about whether we should be airing more of it publicly, not because we were trying to hide it but because the work was still being done. The work was not at a point of conclusion, and therefore we would not have been at the point of making a ministerial statement about the end result.

As First Minister, you have an overview of every aspect of Government policy, and from time to time, you will be much more closely involved in certain aspects. As we got into 2020, I was consumed by something else rather large, but I would have been aware of the work that was under way, and certainly aware of the issues, because they were not peculiar to transport projects. We were aware of and concerned about the reclassification of NPD, because it had a potential knock-on effect on our capital programme.

I was obviously very aware—and this is pertinent to the A9—that we had no clear and obvious funding route for a period because of the NPD issue and because of the, frankly, very significant constraints on our capital budget. Those were issues that we were grappling with and trying to resolve. Inevitably, that takes you into a period in which a lot of the work seems to be internal to Government as we try to find the solutions. What it does not, in my view, equate to is a lack of focus and drive; it is just that we had a problem that we were desperately trying to find the solutions to, but the solutions were not easy to find.

Okay. I might come back with other thoughts later, but I will now bring in Fergus Ewing.

Thank you, convener. Good morning, Nicola. Was a decision ever taken during your tenure as First Minister to deprioritise investment in dualling the A9 project?

No, not as far as I am aware. I think that you were in government during most of that time, Fergus, so you would be aware of any decisions taken there. You will remember as well as I do some of the difficult discussions that we had around the Cabinet table about budgets; as is the nature of budgetary processes, we had to balance the competing priorities. At different times, different projects will have greater immediate priority than others, but it is always about trying to balance and achieve the objectives that we have set.

Sure. We did, as a party, promise it in manifestos in 2007, and ever since. From 2011, the dualling promise had the target date of 2025. We have seen an extract from a Cabinet paper from November 2018 advising that the use of private finance would mean that the 2025 completion date could not be met. How can that be squared with the assertion that it became clear only in 2023, last year, that the 2025 deadline would not be met?

I think it can be squared pretty easily, actually, drawing on what I have just said. I do not know how many of the papers you would have seen personally at the time, but at that point, we were not in a position where we had decided whether we would definitely use private finance, because we did not have a clear private finance route, or opt for publicly funded straight capital provision.

09:45  

The situation at that point was that, had we gone down a private finance route, the 2025 target would not have been capable of being met, but we had not closed the door to the design build capital funded option. If memory serves me correctly, it was only at the end of 2022 or thereabouts that it became clear that there was no route to a 2025 target being met. With any kind of target, as you get closer to it, there is a diminishing prospect of it being met, but, until that point, there was, at least in theory, a route to meeting the 2025 target. That closed off around the end of 2022 or 2023. Clearly, there were other factors at play around then as well.

I think it is fair to say that we have heard evidence from industry that the civil engineering contracting world knew from 2018 at the latest that the 2025 target was not going to be met in practice, because the scale of the work that was required could not have been done in seven years. As you pointed out, I was in government as well, and I have said on several occasions that if there is any responsibility that we must accept for the failure to dual the A9, I am part of that, although I never had portfolio responsibility for it and I did not receive papers on the matter from 2018.

Do you feel now that, because the target was such a major promise for so long from both the SNP and the Scottish Government, an apology should be given to the people of the Highlands? It is fair to say, in my perception at any rate, that the issue has been met with considerable dismay and concern in my constituency and in the Highlands in general, especially in view of the tragic loss of life that we have seen.

I will answer the question quite carefully and seriously, because people will have heard me during my time as First Minister readily apologise for things that I think merit an apology. I also think it is important not to reduce the value of an apology by saying these things simply to get out of a tight spot. I am sorry that we will not have dualled the A9 by 2025. I regret that, and I think that people in the Highlands have every right to feel the way that they do about it, not just because the target was set and not met, but because the nature of the project and the reasons for making the commitment to dualling the A9 were so serious and involved safety. The loss of life on the A9 is a matter of deep regret for everybody. I think that those feelings are justified.

I want to be clear, though, that I do not accept that we failed to meet that target because we just did not bother and we were not trying to meet it. The 2025 target was set for the right reasons and we were committed to it. I was Deputy First Minister at the time that the target was set by Government, so I am not trying to escape responsibility. Then, I had no direct involvement in the A9. However, when I look at it now, I would ask myself whether we were as candid as we should have been with ourselves, as well as with the public, about just how challenging it would always have been to meet the target, even with the fairest of winds.

My second point, which I have made already, is that a number of things happened subsequently that were not foreseen or even, in some cases, foreseeable, which meant that it was even more difficult to meet the target. I will be careful in what I say here: I am not sitting here saying that I am sorry that we messed up because we just did not bother trying to do this. I am sorry that a whole range of circumstances, many of which were beyond our control, meant that we were not able to deliver on that target.

I absolutely understand the feelings of people in the Highlands about that. I am no longer in government, but that is why I think it is now so important that the project is completed according to the revised timescales that have been set.

Thank you for that answer, but I wish to press you on a couple more points, please. The preparatory work, the design work, choosing the preferred route, the progress to made orders, the compulsory purchase orders and the ancillary roads orders are all very time consuming and complex, as you alluded to earlier. However, do you not feel, as I do, that some of the 11 sections could and should have moved into procurement much earlier, and that that is a failure?

I do not want to repeat everything that I have already said, but we ran into a period when we did not have obvious funding procurement routes, and much of the work that was being done was to resolve that.

On a more open point, given the considerable slippage in the 2025 timescale—which is what the committee is considering, in part, right now—it is important for the Government to look back, at an appropriate point, for the purpose of learning lessons for future projects, of whatever scale. Notwithstanding everything that I have said about the very real reasons that we were confronted with, which led to the delays that we are talking about, it is important to look back and ask ourselves, or for the Government to ask itself, whether there were points at which different decisions could have accelerated other sections of the route going into procurement more quickly. My saying that is not me sitting here saying that the answer to that is yes, but it would be reasonable to do an exercise—it would perhaps be unreasonable not to do it—that openly asked those questions so that we can learn appropriate lessons.

I will ask the same question, but in a more specific form. It is clear from the documentation that four of the 11 sections went to made orders. They went to the completion of the land identified to be compulsorily purchased and all the ancillary roads orders. Two sections went to made orders in July 2021, and another two went in October 2021. I have raised this matter during this session of the Parliament, because I genuinely do not understand why those sections are not in procurement now and why they were not moved swiftly into procurement. Can you answer that question now? It is quite a specific question, of which you have not had notice, so, if not, I wonder whether you could go away and let us have an answer later.

I am not making this assertion, but many people say that the influence of the Green Party, as part of the Government since 2021, has had a negative effect, as it alone, of all the parties represented in Holyrood, is opposed—very strongly opposed—to the dualling of the A9. Therefore, there is a very strong feeling that the Greens played a part in what has happened, although, to be candid about it, I have no evidence for that.

Could you address that point and the previous specific and detailed question now or, if not, later? We can provide you with the names of each of the four sections, although I will not do that now. Given that those sections went to that milestone stage of made orders, why were they not moved into procurement at that time, if we were serious about progressing the project as quickly as possible?

Let me try to answer that as best I can, perhaps in a general sense. On any particular points, I am more than happy to look at the paperwork after this meeting and come back with specific answers in writing, if that would be helpful to the committee.

I will say two things in general. First, it is not the case that the issues with the A9 were down to the Greens’ involvement in the Government. People can read the Bute house agreement for themselves to see that the commitment to the A9 was not affected by that agreement. As First Minister during that time, I can say that that was not the case.

With the caveat that I will look again to see whether I can throw some light on other issues, my second point is that we are talking about a period when our revenue and capital budgets were under significant and growing pressure. Members of the Parliament have heard statements that various finance secretaries have made during recent times about the need for savings and the need to reprioritise. We all know the reasons for that. The overarching reason is the funding challenges that we have been confronted with in relation to the on-going work to try to find ways to make progress on sections of the road through either direct capital or a private finance model. In my view, the funding challenges are the overarching reason. However, as I said, I am happy to go away to see whether there are further comments that might be helpful.

I have a final question on that. Why do you argue that there is such pressure on funding when the capital budget has been circa £4,000 million to £5,000 million per year, and the estimated cost of dualling the A9 is substantially less than that? Given the scale of the capital budget, surely many people are right to say that the A9 was not the top priority for the Scottish Government, because the money was there—there was between £4,000 million and £5,000 million a year. Plainly, at least some of the sections that have not yet been dualled could have been dualled if more priority had been attached to that. That is a strongly held view in the Highlands, so I am putting that to you to see whether you think that that is a fair point, or whether you think that it is completely unfair to you and your colleagues who were making the decisions at the time.

This is probably a classic politician’s answer—I am trying not to give those—but, if it is possible, it is both. It is absolutely fair for people in the Highlands to say that the A9 should have been prioritised above the other demands on the capital budget. If I was living in the Highlands, there is no doubt that I would have that view, so I am not in any way suggesting that that is somehow an unfair view for Highlanders to hold.

The other side of it relates to the way that you posed that question to me. I understand why you did it—you are speaking on behalf of your constituents, so I am not criticising that in any way—but you were in the Government for many years, so you know that to point to a big budget when speaking about a particular project that is small, relative to the size of the budget, and say, “Well, why couldn’t that have been done?” does not fully encapsulate the budgeting process.

For most, if not all, of the time that I was in the Government, the demands on the capital budget exceeded the quantum of it. Fergus Ewing knows that as well as I do, because of his time in the Government. Within that, there is a legitimate question about the relative priority that is given to different projects, but in the process of budgeting we try to balance all of those things to progress everything that we want to do, and that will inevitably lead to supporters of different projects feeling, at times, that their project is not getting the priority that it needs.

However, it is not a fair characterisation of how such things work to simply point to the size of the budget and the cost of the A9 and somehow say that there was no problem with funding through our capital programme.

As the convener said, our focus is not so much on trying to carry out a post-mortem; the focus is more on prognosis than on diagnosis. It is about how we can put this right as quickly as possible. Do you, as a seasoned and experienced politician, think that it is fair to say that other parts of Scotland have done quite well from transport infrastructure projects over the 25 years of devolution during which both of us have been servants in the Parliament? I am thinking of the Borders railway, the Aberdeen western peripheral route, the massive improvements to the M74 and the M8 and the magnificent Forth crossing—and, well, Edinburgh chose the trams. Other parts of Scotland have had massive investment, which is welcome, but do you agree that it is now, if you like, the turn of the Highlands?

10:00  

As an aside, I note that, against the wishes of the Government that you and I were both part of, the Parliament choosing the trams had implications for other aspects of the capital programme at that time.

All of the projects that you have spoken about were necessary and important. As a relatively new driver, I have only recently driven across some of those projects—I drove on the A9 for the first time just a couple of weeks ago. The projects were all important, but I do not think that that is the point that you are making.

It is not the case that we inappropriately prioritised the Queensferry crossing, the M74 improvements or the Borders railway. However, I suppose that my short answer to your question would be yes—although we ran into the difficulties that I have been speaking about, I certainly hope and expect that the Government now prioritises completing the A9.

The programme that has been set out, with timescales, will still face challenges along the way—I would be astonished if it did not. To me, it looks like a programme that will succeed, and it is essential that it is given the priority to ensure that it does.

Ms Sturgeon, in answer to Fergus Ewing, you have been clear about the Greens’ influence on the dualling of the A9. Obviously, the backdrop to your tenure in government was some ambitious climate change targets, including the setting of an extremely ambitious interim target in 2019. I wonder whether looking to tackle climate change in the context of failing to meet a number of emissions targets had any influence on the prioritisation of dualling the A9.

That is a really good question, and I think that it is an important question when we are considering any roads projects. We could talk about this in a lot more detail but, in respect of the A9 generally, no, I do not think that it did. The A9 was effectively excluded from the Bute house agreement—I am using shorthand here—but the commitment to it continued because of the important reasons for the dualling of the A9. It is not about providing extra road capacity for more cars; it is fundamentally about safety, so it is a roads project that is important to complete.

More generally, the climate cannot be divorced from the consideration of road projects in this day and age; it is an important part of any deliberation. However, I would argue strongly that the reason why we are sitting here talking about delays to the dualling of the A9 is not about the Greens being in government or because we downgraded the priority of it for some consideration of climate and emissions targets.

Thanks; that is very helpful. I am just trying to square the timeline in my mind. On the basis of the evidence that we have heard, around 2014 seems to be the point at which a red flag was raised over the plausibility of completing the project. I think that you pointed to 2014 in terms of the financing aspect and there was probably a significant change in that in 2018. However, the Scottish Government did not find out until 2022 that it would not be possible to complete by 2025. I struggle to find that explanation to be realistic and plausible, given the track record and what had gone before. Perhaps you could comment on that.

As I look at this from the perspective that I have now, some of the questions that the committee is posing are reasonable. That does not mean that there is anything sinister there. As a Government, we were desperately trying to find a path to meet a 2025 target. Obviously, the prospect and chances of doing that were diminishing with every month and year that passed, but we had not given up on doing so.

The 2014 date is significant because of the Office for National Statistics issue with the classification of NPD. That was not the point at which we had to consider a private finance option, as that was always a requirement; it was the point at which we had to effectively scrap the one that would have been the option and try to find another one, which took considerable work and time.

Then there was the period around 2018. As I think I said in response to the convener, if I look at the issue now, in hindsight, that is a point at which it is reasonable to at least pose the question about whether we should have been airing a bit more of this publicly. If I remember correctly, the original estimate for construction was about six years. By 2018, you are getting to the point at which, even if you have the finance procurement route settled, you are starting to get tight for a 2025 target.

If I was to go back to relive that period, I do not think that I have read anything that would make me think that there is something that we could have done to change things and to hit that target, but I would say that we should perhaps have been airing a lot more of the difficulties that we were in or the challenges that we were facing at that point a bit more openly. However, that is me applying hindsight.

What was the impact of Covid on the project?

The impact of Covid on the A9 project would have been multifaceted, as it was on every aspect of Government priorities outside what was required to manage Covid. It would have impacted civil service time and wider industry engagement. Everything associated with a big project would have been and was impacted by Covid.

Again, I am using shorthand here, which is probably always a bit dangerous, but, effectively, outside what we needed to do to deal with Covid—this applied not just here but everywhere—the rest of Government shut down to some extent. That, of course, impacted on the A9 project, as it did on many other things.

From your assessment as the then First Minister, did the impact of Covid have a multiplier effect so that the impact was not just during the period when Covid was occurring? How quickly did Government and all the operations get back on track?

That is an excellent observation. I know that we are talking about the A9, but that point is one of the things that is quite difficult conceptually for people to get their heads round, including people in Government at the time, but also very real across a whole range of issues. In the national health service, for example, the period in which elective treatment was shut down had a significant multiplier effect in terms of what it takes to recover that position.

On everything else, including the A9 project, it takes more time to catch up with such things than the period of the pause, for a variety of reasons. It is not that people are sitting round and not trying to get back on top of things; it is just the way that such things work. On a whole range of things and in many walks of life, the recovery period from the Covid experience will be much longer than the two years-plus of Covid.

That is helpful. I have a final question. How were you advised about the project running behind time? Was it regularly discussed at Cabinet, for example, or was it broadly left to the relevant minister and officials?

Again, I am happy to set that out in more detail. My written submission covered the period when I was the Cabinet Secretary for Infrastructure, Investment and Cities, not First Minister. I am not asking for more requests for information but, if it would be helpful to set a bit more of that down in writing, I will do that for the committee.

In summary, as First Minister, you have an overview. The day-to-day responsibility for making sure that things are being done as they should be on any project, as is the case on the A9 project, is with the relevant cabinet secretary. As First Minister, although I was not copied into everything, I was copied into significant briefings or submissions on things, and I would ask questions and get more involved in periods when I thought that there was a need for it. That is how these things generally work.

The A9 would have featured from time to time in Cabinet discussions—Fergus Ewing quoted from a Cabinet minute a wee while ago—and, at particular moments, the cabinet secretary would have brought things to Cabinet. I do not have all the papers in front of me, so I cannot say exactly when that would have happened with the A9, but I would be happy to provide more information on that if it is appropriate.

Thank you.

Good morning. To continue on the point that my colleague Maurice Golden just asked about, Alex Salmond, during our evidence session with him, said that he “would have been astounded” if any cabinet secretary had decided to be slow on the project and had not told him. Did you, in your time as First Minister, have a similar working environment?

Similar to what? I am not sure what you mean.

I am talking about the working relationship with the cabinet secretary who was in charge of the A9, and whether he had not given you an update or had been slow on the project.

I think that my reputation—it is for others to decide whether this is accurate—is that I was possibly more of a hands-on micromanager than my predecessor.

Given that you were the minister during the Queensferry crossing project, and that was finished on time, why do you think that the A9 project has slowed down or has not been running on time?

I think that it is for the reasons that I have spoken about. Again, I say this with hindsight—that is one of the features of exercises such as this; we look at all these things from a different perspective. The 2025 target was always a massive mountain to climb, and to get to the summit by 2025 was going to require everything to go our way.

We then had certain things that did not go our way, such as the 2014 ONS issue, and austerity—I am not making a party-political point there; austerity put huge pressure on budgets. There was also Covid, which I have just spoken about. Those things were over and above the inherent complexities of the project around design, route selection, public consultation and environmental assessment—the project runs through a national park, and there are sites of historical significance. When we add on some unforeseen complexities, that is the reason why we are sitting here.

That does not make it easy or acceptable from the perspective of the Highlands, but nor does it equate to a situation in which the Government simply did not bother trying to progress the A9 project. We had significant commitment and drive behind it, but we encountered very significant challenges along the way.

I have one last question. If you were First Minister now, or if you went back a year ago, what would you do differently to speed up the project?

This is where I will be candid with the committee. I have looked again—as you would expect me to do in advance of being here—at all the papers that I would have seen, and some that I did not, which I would not, as First Minister, routinely have seen at the time.

Before I say what I am about to say, I think that it is important not to sit here and say that there is nothing that we could have done to speed it up. It is important that there are processes to enable us to look back and really ask those hard questions. There will undoubtedly be points at which different decisions might have speeded things up to some extent.

Do I think that there is anything, in the context that we were, and that we came to be, dealing with, that we could have done that would have meant that the 2025 target turned out to be deliverable? My honest answer is no, I do not, because of the nature of the challenges with which we were confronted.

If I was First Minister then, is there something that I think that I could have done to meet that target? I genuinely do not. If I was First Minister now, which is not a prospect that I really like to contemplate, I would, I think, be confident—with all the caveats that one always has to add around major infrastructure projects—in the programme and the timeline that the Government has now set out.

In your previous answer, you drew an analogy with mountains—I am not sure whether that was simply because you knew that we would now be turning to Edward Mountain.

I do not particularly want to think about climbing—sorry. [Laughter.]

I would be careful where you go with that, Ms Sturgeon.

I will be very careful what I say there.

10:15  

Just to start off with, when we questioned Alex Salmond on 8 May, he gave a very clear description of how the Cabinet worked. He said that the “big discussion” at the Cabinet was always the infrastructure plan, and that he would have known if anyone was dragging their feet. He picked me up for suggesting that Alex Neil could be dragging his feet, and said that that could not have happened, and that a minister would have come to him if there was a problem with the delay. Is that how your Cabinet worked as well?

Again, I will be slightly light-hearted here—I sometimes hear descriptions of how Mr Salmond’s Cabinet operated, and I wonder whether I was part of the same one.

Putting that to one side—

I will just leave that there.

Where he is absolutely right is that, in the period around the financial crash and after that, infrastructure was a central priority of the Government. Infrastructure is always a priority of the Government but, in terms of the economic situation that we were facing, trying to drive economic activity through infrastructure projects was absolutely a central focus, and Alex was absolutely pushing that.

As I say, I think that my reputation is probably that I was more of a hands-on micromanager than my predecessor was. I would be involved in issues that needed to be resolved or pushed on. Cabinet secretaries would come to me and I would go to cabinet secretaries where there were issues or where I thought that things were not moving fast enough. That is the nature of how Government works on a day-to-day basis.

Okay. If we use the figure that you used earlier—which was, interestingly, the same figure that I came up with—the estimate was that it would be a six-year project to build it. From my experience of compulsory purchase orders and how they actually work, they can take a minimum of three years to get through, by the time you have gone through the whole process of issuing notices, getting confirmation from the Government, issuing the orders, speaking to the owners, and a public inquiry, if that is the way it goes. That means that it would take nine years altogether. Therefore, if you were going to be building the A9 by 2025, alarm bells should have been ringing in 2017-18 that the process was not moving along at the necessary pace. Would you agree with that synopsis?

Where I would take issue with how you have characterised it is that a lot of the work was on-going at that point. Much of the preparatory work, to use that catch-all phrase, was on-going. We are now in a position where, with the exception of one of the sections of the route, all the orders are in place, so it is not the case that none of that was progressing.

The six-year estimate, of course, was made way back—it was an estimate of the construction period. The significant barrier that we were grappling with at that point was around funding options, in terms of coming up with a private finance possibility versus the pressure on our capital programme. You can have everything else in place—you can have all the preparatory work done—but you need to have routes to funding and procurement. That was the aspect that was the most significant challenge.

With respect, the funding is critically important—I fully accept that—but what I have laid out to you is a timescale that a surveyor and people working within the industry would set to deliver the project, which I think, from the moment you issue the first order, would be approximately nine years. That is why I am confused that the issue only came to light in 2023, when it probably should have come to light back in 2017. Did Mr Yousaf, who was the transport minister in 2017-18, come to you and tell you that there was a problem then? If he did not, we have probably found out where the delay started from.

I think that that would be an unfair characterisation of his position. I do not recall a particular occasion when he came to me and said, “First Minister, we’ve got a big problem with the A9.” However, we were always looking at progress and at the issues that we were grappling with.

It is important that we are not overly binary about this. Of course, we had, by 2017-18, realised that there were significant hurdles to completion on target, but it was only by late 2022 or early 2023 that it was clear that there was no viable route to 2025. That was a funding issue.

Again, a lot of the necessary work to get sections of the project into construction was being and had been done, and things were progressing and moving along. It was not some binary matter of our finding ourselves one day with none of the work done and our not having enough years left to do it; it was an on-going process in which we were determined to try to find a route to 2025. It was a diminishing prospect as we got closer—obviously, that stands to reason—and we reached a point at which it became clear that there was no such viable route.

I might turn that question back and suggest that a criticism that could be made, perhaps, is that we were so determined to try to find a route that we did not tell ourselves quickly enough that it was not there. If that is a valid criticism, it arises not from a lack of priority or determination but perhaps from the opposite—that is, our desperately wanting to get to a position where we could deliver the target.

This will be my final question. I do not doubt your determination to deliver the target, but clearly it was infeasible by 2017-18, even under the figures that you have given. Surely that would have been the time to tell people across the Highlands that it was not going to be delivered. I think that there will be very few people in the Highlands who, since then, have not seen or do not know somebody killed as a result of the road. I think that we—or, I should say, you—have been dishonest in that the target was not deliverable by the date that your Government promised on 6 December 2011.

I have already made both the points that I would make in response to that question, so you will forgive me if I repeat myself.

First, until that point, the advice to Government was that there was a viable route to 2025. That was the advice, but that viable route depended on capital provision being made available, which was a significant challenge. It is not the case that we were, as you say, just being dishonest.

My second point is one that I made in my first answer to the convener. When I look back on that period, I think that we should perhaps have been airing this more publicly. I certainly think that that is a reasonable question to pose, but if we were guilty of anything at that point, it was of trying our hardest to find the route to 2025, and—I am happy to concede—perhaps taking too long to accept that that was not possible. If that is the case, it happened for the best of reasons.

My condolences and heart go out to every single person who has lost someone on the A9 or who knows someone in that position. The dualling of the A9 has been a priority for the Scottish Government. It has encountered significant challenges; it was always going to, but there were some additional ones. I do not believe that we are sitting here today because Government did not give the issue enough priority, but there is absolutely no doubt that priority must be attached to it until the commitment is met. To go back to Fergus Ewing’s question, I am absolutely of the view that the Government has an obligation to ensure that the revised timetable is now met—and met in full.

Thank you.

I should say that I am not sure that Mr Yousaf was the lead minister for the project at any point—I think that it was Keith Brown.

Yes.

And then Michael Matheson.

Yes.

Your predecessor generously told us that, as we consider how the road might be completed, his advice to the committee, to the Parliament and to the Government would be to appoint Alex Neil as an A9 tsar to oversee the project’s completion. Would you welcome the opportunity to take a view on that concept, as much as on the nominated individual?

I do not think that that would add anything to where we are right now. In fact, I am concerned that, if somebody came in and decided to take a fresh look at everything, that would slow things down. The Government is now in a strong place with funding, the reassessment of the order of the routes and the timescale of the project, so it should be able to get on with that work and be held to account for it. Therefore, that suggestion would hinder rather than help.

As it happens, I met Mr Neil, who was slightly surprised by the suggestion—not that he was disappointed, of course.

I will make no comment.

You referred to the Queensferry crossing. We had an interesting discussion with Màiri McAllan on that point, before she surrendered responsibility for the project to Fiona Hyslop. The Queensferry crossing project was driven by a Government bill—I was the convener of the hybrid committee that took forward the Queensferry crossing route planning and build design. Joe FitzPatrick was on that committee, too. Neither of us was invited to the opening, let me tell you, and that grievance still rankles.

There were lots of sensitivities about the opening that I became aware of only afterwards—it is a sore point.

More generally, my point is that the existence of a parliamentary committee that oversaw some of the harder work created its own momentum. Part of the issue with the A9 is that it is now a multisession project. The parliamentarians who were first involved in discussing it in the chamber have long since retired; we have in effect had 90 new parliamentarians since 2016.

As the project looks as if it could run until 2035, could Parliament be involved in some way, with some sort of institutional memory carrying forward until then, so that somebody else does not have to try to inquire later into everything that will take place in relation to the construction of the route from this point forward? Màiri McAllan thought that there was some merit in considering that.

At the risk of being accused of trying to curry favour with the convener, I say that that suggestion is eminently more sensible than the one that you just asked me about. The A9 was always going to be a multisession project. You know the differences—the Queensferry crossing process was different because of the legislative requirements that were in place around it versus those in place around the A9. That is why there was a parliamentary committee in one process and not in the other.

The suggestion should be considered. I keep saying, “We should consider”—obviously, I am not in government any more, but it is for Parliament, too, to consider that built-in parliamentary oversight process, with MSPs who in effect become specialists. If a project covers multiple parliamentary sessions, that can be a way of carrying forward the institutional memory, as you put it. That should be given serious consideration.

References have been made to the revised completion date of 2035, and many people—including the petitioner, who is with us today, and MSPs from all parties but one—are due to meet John Swinney to urge him to accelerate the date and complete the project before 2035. As you said, every single section has now gone to made orders, with the possible exception of Dunkeld. Therefore, nothing is stopping the scheduling of the completion of the various sections as quickly as the work can be done.

The contractors’ representative has always said that the companies can rise to the occasion and do the work more quickly if they are given the contracts and if the funding is available. Do you agree that that is a reasonable objective and that, if it is at all practical, it would be very desirable indeed—in the light of the failure to meet the original 2025 deadline—to bring the completion date forward from 2035, so that people can see it in our expected lifespan?

If that is practical, yes, I would agree. I have not been in government for more than a year, so it would not be fair of me to comment on whether, if we take all the different factors into account, it is practical. However, if it is, the Government should try to accelerate the timescale. John Swinney’s constituency is on the route of the A9. I am certain that, if it was practical to bring forward completion, he would be very open to doing it, but it is important that I not try to speak for the Government or the First Minister, given that I am not at all close to the detail of those things in the way that I once was.

10:30  

The other ask of the petition that we are considering is whether a memorial to those whose lives have been lost would be appropriate. Transport Scotland was slightly concerned about that proposal and looked at it rather literally as a memorial more or less in the central reservation with people driving past, which I do not think was the suggestion. Your predecessor pointed to the memorial that was built at Queensferry for the people who died during the construction of the Forth rail bridge many years before.

Given the loss of life, is such a memorial appropriate? I do not remember anything similar in Mr Salmond’s time. Both of us have been involved in politics long enough to remember national tragedies such as the Lockerbie bombing or the Piper Alpha disaster in which there was a considerable loss of life and for which there is a memorial that people can go to. What would your thoughts have been if, as the First Minister, you had received such a suggestion? If there is merit in it, what process would evaluate that best and potentially take it to a conclusion?

I would be supportive of that proposal. It would be appropriate. We tend to have memorials to disastrous tragedies that lead to a significant loss of life in a single incident, which is entirely appropriate, but we do not do the same with loss of life over longer periods in situations such as the one that we are speaking about, and we should.

My views on that have possibly been strengthened by the Covid experience. I know from talking to bereaved families, because of my close involvement in that experience, how important it is to have recognition and somewhere that people can go to reflect, remember and come to terms with their grief. The importance of that cannot be overstated. Therefore, the proposal would and does have my general support.

On the process, I again draw from the experience of Covid to some extent. It would be wrong and inappropriate for Government to decide what that should be. The starting point in any such process should be engagement with people who have lost loved ones or who live on the route of the A9—those with, to use the term, lived experience of the loss that we seek to commemorate—and the process should work from there.

Memorials take many different forms. As you said, we all have particular images in our minds when we talk about memorials, but there are lots of Covid memorials that are open spaces, gardens and places where people simply go to reflect. Therefore, it would be important to properly understand what would be meaningful for people who have lost loved ones on the A9.

That draws our questions to an end. Would you like to add anything that we have not touched on?

No—I think that we have covered everything that I expected us to cover. There were a couple of moments when I rather rashly offered to provide more written information. It would be good if the committee could remind me of those, as I no longer have an army of civil servants sitting behind me to remind me later.

Welcome to our world.

Indeed.

I thank you very much for joining us and for the candour with which you have addressed the committee’s questions. I am grateful for your time.

I suspend the meeting briefly for us to rearrange the table.

10:34 Meeting suspended.  

10:36 On resuming—