Chamber and committees

Civil Aviation Authority submission of 6 October 2021

PE1804/OO - Halt Highlands & Islands Airports Ltd's Air Traffic Management Strategy

Thank you for your letter of 15 September 2021 relating to Highlands & Islands Airports Ltd’s (HIAL) Air Traffic Management Strategy, following on from the Civil Aviation Authority’s (CAA) previous submission to the Committee.

In terms of where remote tower technology has been deployed successfully, within the UK remote provision of air traffic control has been commonplace in the Area Control and Approach Control environments. Since their inception in the 1950s Area Control services, which manage aircraft flying at higher altitudes in the UK’s three Flight Information Regions, have been provided ‘remotely’ from en-route Air Traffic Control (ATC) centres. These centres are currently at Swanwick and Prestwick. HIAL does not provide Area Control services, but these remote operations are relevant in that radio communications, navigational aids and surveillance sources such as radar are all remote from the location at which the control service is provided.

HIAL do provide Approach Control services, which control aircraft arriving and departing from airports. Since the mid-1990s, Approach Control services for aircraft flying to and from the airports around London have been provided remotely and are currently located at Swanwick. Again communications, navigational aids and surveillance sources are remote from the site at which the air traffic controllers provide the service.

Aircraft in the immediate vicinity of an airport are traditionally controlled from the control tower at the airport. In 2009, the first approval for remote provision of tower ATC services was approved at Heathrow. The location is off airfield, and all tower equipment and services are delivered to this remote location for service provision in the event of evacuation of Heathrow’s tower. Notably, this contingency facility does not include delivery of video to replicate the controllers’ views from the Visual Control Room (VCR).

In 2019 a full video VCR was approved at Cranfield. This takes video from remote camera systems fed into a control room which has no direct line of sight to the airfield. In 2021 a full VCR for London City airport was approved at Swanwick Centre. This takes video from an array of cameras situated at the airport and delivers this information, along with the communications, navigational aid and surveillance information, to Swanwick, making London City airport the first major international airport in the world to be fully controlled from a remote digital air traffic control tower.

While the UK CAA has no role in the acceptance or approval of systems outside the UK, we are also aware of the successful deployment of remote systems in Norway, Sweden, and Hungary, as well as multiple trials of systems and proofs of concept across the globe. The success of these installations has not been dependent on favourable local geography or terrain. The entire ethos of the remote tower concept is that nothing changes, only the controller views their location on screens instead of through windows.

The Committee also stated that it would also be keen to understand what the CAA believes constitutes successful deployment. Successful deployment occurs when a satisfactory safety case has been produced, containing robust safety assurance for the planned change in service (i.e. the establishment of a remote service). Only when the facilities and supporting equipment have been audited, and any CAA findings addressed satisfactorily, will we grant approval for the systems and facilities that comprise the remote facility. Complex systems such as remote VCR provision are subject to multi-faceted oversight, involving a mix of meetings, desktop audits and on-site audits. The CAA has a business objective of ‘zero regulatory delay’, but that is dependent on the provision of satisfactory safety assurance.

Prior to the practical exercise of installing, commissioning, and testing of new facilities by a service provider and seeking approval from the CAA, our regulatory team is often asked to comment on outline proposals or concepts at the beginning of projects which may take many years to deliver. If asked, at this stage, the CAA will advise without prejudice if it is aware of any reason why the project should not proceed. The absence of such a reason in no way affects the CAA’s ability to refuse to approve an installed, commissioned, and tested system if the safety assurance which supports it is not acceptable.

I hope this answers the Committee’s questions, but please do let me know if we can be of any further assistance.